Judicial Review vs. Parliamentary Sovereignty: Protecting Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Amendments

It is occasionally argued that judicial review of basic legislation is not required by a written constitution. Instead, a nation may come up with other ways to shield the constitution from interference by the ordinary political apparatus. One can wonder if the opposite is true. Is it possible to imagine a nation without an established constitution that has judicial review of primary legislation? Remarkably, Marshall CJ was the first to recognise the idea of judicial review in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison. In India, the concept was tested through a series of extremely strict constitutional modifications rather than a particular instance. The main focus of this paper would be on the experience of the Indian constitution both during its inception and as it evolved throughout time. It also describes how the SC of India plays a special and ground breaking role in rendering rulings in matters involving challenges to laws and changes made by the Parliament. A contemporary constitutional framework is used to examine India as a case study. The paper provides some significant sections: It first explores the origins of the concept of judicial review and how it was first added. In order to better comprehend the concept, including the relevant constitutional provisions, a comprehensive overview of judicial review has been presented together with case laws. Lastly, the reasons why judicial review seeks to challenge the Indian Parliament's sovereignty have been emphasised. In addition, a debate has been held on the proper application of the Supreme Court's unique power to ensure that it continues to be a constitutional instrument rather than a machine to forward the Judiciary's own agenda